Analysts who follow Turkey’s unexpected cooperation with Russia and Iran in Syria often ask whether Ankara has embarked on a new path in its foreign policy. Is Turkey’s recent partnership with Russia and Iran just a tactical plot because these two powers are the ones calling the shots in Syria, or is Ankara really looking for strategic alternatives to Nato? Recently Walter Russell Mead, an influential scholar and analyst of American foreign policy, answered the last question with a clear “no.” According to Mead, “The Russian-Iranian partnership now dominating Syria and upending the regional balance of power is Turkey’s worst nightmare come true. Turkish leaders know their country can’t counter this transformation without American support.” Mead appears optimistic about the ability of Washington to mend fences with Turkey.
Yet, the facts on the ground point out to a different reality. The latest wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey has a much larger scale and scope than previous ones. Putting Turkish-American relations back on track may prove an insurmountable challenge when both the Turkish body politic and public opinion is caught in an anti-Western nationalist frenzy. Most opinion polls show that about 80 percent of Turks consider the United States the country’s top national-security threat. Almost 90 percent support the Turkish military incursion in Afrin, in northern Syria. That operation, though now largely over, could still escalate into a military confrontation between Turkey and the US because American special forces are training the Syrian Kurds in Manbij, not too far from Afrin.
The driving factor of anti-Americanism in Turkey has traditionally been based on conspiracy theories. For decades, Turkish nationalists believed America had a hidden agenda to support Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East. Stories of American military support for the PKK – a Kurdish separatist movement recognized as a terrorist organization by Washington – have long circulated in Turkish nationalist circles. Such rumors came to be accepted as conventional wisdom. Well, this conspiracy theory has now become reality. In the absence of a better alternative, the YPG – the Syrian extension of the PKK – has become America’s main military partner on the ground in the fight against ISIS. This, in the eyes of Ankara, makes its Nato ally a supporter of terrorism and it validates the worst conspiracies fueling anti-Americanism.
While the PKK represents an existential threat for Turkey, ISIS does not. In fact, many in Washington believe Ankara has for years turned a blind eye to ISIS sympathizers and has actively supported Syrian jihadi terrorist groups linked to Al Qaeda. Add to the already tense Turkish-American blame game the issue of Fetullah Gulen, a US-based Turkish cleric accused by Ankara of masterminding the failed coup in 2016, and you have an even more toxic mix. Erdogan is infuriated by Washington’s reluctance to extradite Gulen. Not surprisingly, the Gulen affair adds an additional layer of conspiracy to arguments that Washington was behind the failed the coup. All these factors enable Erdogan to stoke anti-Americanism as part of his populist nationalist discourse to win the upcoming presidential elections.
What is striking in the anti-Kurdish and anti-American nationalist frenzy in Turkey is the perception of Russia as a potential ally in Syria. Erdogan and the pro-government media are remarkably silent on Russian-Kurdish cooperation in northern Syria. No one in Turkey uttered a word when the Russian commander at Syria’s Hmeimim military base and a YPG spokesman appeared before cameras to announce they were conducting joint operations against ISIS. Russian warplanes provided air cover for the YPG while the Kurdish forces protected Russian forces on the eastern side of the Euphrates.
In fact, Russia’s support of Syrian Kurds gained much more momentum in 2015 after Turkey shot down a Russian military jet for violating its airspace. Shortly after the incident, Moscow began delivering weapons to the YPG in western Syria. In March last year, despite reconciliation between Ankara and Moscow, reports surfaced that Russia was building a military facility in Kurdish-controlled Afrin, where Russian military advisors were to provide training to Kurdish forces. Russia has also provided diplomatic support to the YPG. Late last year, Moscow proposed a draft constitution for Syria that included Kurdish autonomy, and more recently Russia decided to invite the Democratic Union Party — the political arm of the YPG — to a congress of Syrian ethnic groups in Sochi and announced the party would be included in the Astana talks.
So why is Erdogan silent on such blatant Russian-Kurdish cooperation? Ankara appears reluctant to alienate both Russia and the United States at the same time. Erdogan probably wants to cultivate good relations with Russia in order to gain further leverage in relations with Washington. At a time when Russia is gaining ground in the Middle East and Iran appears to be winning in Syria, he clearly believes American policymakers cannot afford to “lose” Turkey. After all, Turkey is home to a major American airbase as well as to Nato defense shield radars that serve to contain Iran. These are assets give Ankara the leverage it needs with Washington. As usual, there is a strong belief in Ankara than Washington needs Turkey more than Turkey needs America.
Under such circumstances, Ankara can even get away with buying S-400 missile defense systems from Russia. Despite such tactical flirtations, there are clear limits to how far the Turkish-Russian cooperation can go. In addition to potential problems with Moscow on the Kurdish front in Syria, the two countries have diverging interests in critical areas such as the future of the Syrian regime, Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria, the Crimean annexation issue in Ukraine, Russian support for Greek Cypriots and Moscow’s support for Armenia against Azerbaijan. In short, there is no shortage of real differences between Turkey and Russia. This is why the partnership is bound to remain tactical and void of long-term strategic convergence.
At the end of the day, much will depend on how Washington manages its tactical cooperation with Syrian Kurds and its strategic alliance with Ankara. This will be an uphill struggle for the new American secretary of state.
Ömer Taşpınar is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a professor of national-security strategy at the National Defense University in Washington.
AFP PHOTO/Alexander NEMENOV
