On April 23, French President Emmanuel Macron arrived in Washington, DC, for his first official visit to the United States. Macron’s agenda, much like that of Donald Trump himself, is ambitious. It includes, among other things, a plan to solidify a newly invigorated partnership with the United States, based on a personal relationship with the American president, and to convince Trump not to revoke the Iran nuclear deal. While the former may be within reach – Trump famously enjoys being courted, and responds favorably to overtures from other world leaders – the latter may prove much harder. Although it remains to be seen whether Macron can set forth a vision for Iran (and perhaps the region) that is acceptable to Trump and his “America First” base, one thing is becoming increasingly clear: the French president is intent on carving out a more prominent role for France in the Middle East.
Tension has been steadily rising in a region already rife with conflict and power struggles. Saudi Arabia’s new crown prince has doubled down on the ongoing Saudi rivalry with Iran and, along with the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, imposed a political and diplomatic blockade against the state of Qatar. Regional rivalries are also playing out in Syria, where Iran and Israel are coming closer than ever to direct confrontation against the backdrop of the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II. Yemen and Libya are in dire straits politically, economically and socially. And in Lebanon, both regional and international actors are watching wearily as Hezbollah’s role, and actions, take on an increasingly dominant tone.
Since becoming president, Macron has reinvigorated France’s role in the Middle East. His predecessor, Francois Hollande, kept a largely hands-off policy, save for the near-intervention in Syria following Bashar Al Assad’s contravention of then-US president Barack Obama’s “redline.” But Macron’s actions so far seem to indicate a wider appetite for French involvement in the region, from his intervention to “save” embattled Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri from a Saudi intimidation scheme, to his outspoken advocacy for a strike on Syria following Assad’s latest purported chemical weapons attack, to his ongoing efforts to save the Iran nuclear deal from a US-led demise.
On Lebanon, Macron acted swiftly and decisively late last year to defuse tensions with Saudi Arabia after it summoned Hariri to Riyadh and purportedly coerced him into resigning on national television (a decision he reversed after meeting with Macron in Paris). In a flurry of diplomatic activity, Macron made an unscheduled visit to Riyadh to discuss the issue, which was followed by a meeting between Hariri and French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian in Saudi Arabia and finally Hariri’s trip to Paris, where he walked back his resignation.
In Syria, Macron was a vocal proponent of punitive strikes, stating clearly that France had evidence of Assad’s use of chemical weapons and that such action was in violation of French red lines. Macron, who last summer said that “when you fix red lines, if you don’t know how to make sure they are respected, you are choosing to be weak,” went so far as to imply that France would conduct its own strikes in the absence of a US response, in contrast to Hollande’s inaction following Obama’s 11th hour decision not to go through with American strikes in 2013. Post-strike, Macron has made clear that he disagrees with Trump’s decision to withdraw remaining US troops in Syria following the (physical) defeat of ISIS, arguing that a continued military presence remains necessary to ensure the terrorists do not regroup and to act as a countering force to Iranian influence in the region.
Finally, on Iran, under Macron’s proposal, the US and Europe would respond to concerns about potential Iranian nuclear activity beyond 2025, address Iran’s ballistic missile program, and on a more strategic level, engender conditions for a political solution to contain Iranian ambitions and actions in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
When it comes to Syria and Lebanon, Macron can say that he achieved what he set out to do, which is to draw a French line at the use of chemical weapons by Assad and to bring back traditional French support for Lebanon’s Western-inclined leaders. On the Iran front, the utility of Macron’s advocacy remains to be seen. But given the French president’s purposeful, action-oriented leadership style, his budding “bromance” with Trump, and his strong position on the need to prevent a nuclear arms race in the region, one can see a road to compromise in the near future.
Macron has made it clear that he is a man of action, stating that “on every issue, I do what I say, and that’s something new.” Even as he inevitably discovers the limitations of his personal powers of persuasion, his strategic mindset and desire to forge a strong relationship with the US could prove to be an effective counterbalance to Trump’s more emotional and tactical responses to crises. In a region like the Middle East, this new type of French-US alliance could potentially lead to positive developments on several fronts. The questions that remain are whether Macron’s strategic mindset will translate into a coherent transatlantic strategy for the region, and what a French role within that strategy would look like. For the time being, one thing is clear: Whether in a supporting role or a leading one, Macron’s France will not be sitting on the sidelines.
Jasmine El-Gamal is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, where she focuses primarily on US Middle East policy and violent extremism. From 2008-2015, El-Gamal served as a Middle East policy advisor and a special assistant for national-security affairs at the US department of defense.
AFP PHOTO/POOL/LUDOVIC MARIN
