Having won the battle for the northern Syrian city of Afrin, Turkey now faces the much more daunting task of winning the peace. Motivated first by the priority to drive the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) from its southern border, Turkey has been left with a governance vacuum that it will struggle to fill. There is a precedent in its attempt to set up a local administration, but it is for the most part a lesson in failure, and Afrin presents an even more formidable challenge.
At stake is more than just Ankara’s fight against the YPG and the affiliated Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) on its own soil. While a failure to establish durable governance in Afrin could destabilise the region, the city is also a test case for post-conflict Syrian communities – and whether the Kurdish-Arab hostilities fueled by the war can be assuaged.
After two months of fighting the YPG in Afrin, the Turkish military announced complete control over the northwestern Syrian region on March 18. Operation Olive Branch backed by Syrian rebels not only defeated the YPG militarily, it also ousted its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which was in charge of leading the civilian administration in the area. To fill the vacuum and consolidate its gains, Turkey has combined efforts to secure the area with a simultaneous attempt to build a new administrative structure.
Following an invitation from Ankara, dozens of Syrian Kurds, interim officials and members of civil society convened in Turkey’s southern city of Gaziantep, where a 20-member interim local council of 11 Kurds, eight Arabs and one Turkmen were appointed to run the city. The council members are all native residents of Afrin and do not have direct affiliations with the PYD or YPG, which are branded by Turkey as terrorist groups. The interim council, headed by a Kurd, is responsible for establishing and overseeing sub-councils in smaller cities across the region and, in terms of hierarchy, it is at least theoretically attached to the Aleppo city council and supervised by the opposition’s interim government.
Both Turkey and the Afrin council members have emphasised that the body is temporary and will be replaced with a more representative council as soon as the region is stable. But until that happens, the council will be in charge of essential sectors, such as aid, education and the media. With Turkey’s support, the council is also meant to eradicate rebel factions in Afrin and establish a local police force. Turkey and its allies will remain in complete control of regional security.
While it is impossible to predict the council’s success, a look at the city of Jarablus on the western bank of the Euphrates provides a possible blueprint for Turkey’s role in Syria. After Turkey’s military drove ISIS from the district in 2016, a similar local council was set up, replicating a pattern seen in other rebel-held areas. The newly appointed council backed by Turkey, however, lacked legitimacy in the eyes of local residents.
But it was the council’s inability to deliver basic public services, because of its lack of experience and funding, which quickly increased resentment, resulting in widespread demonstrations that eventually toppled it. If anything, Afrin residents are generally considered more hostile to Turkey, which is largely perceived as an occupier, negatively affecting the popularity of the interim council. Additionally, the influx of internally displaced people moving to Afrin, particularly from rural Damascus and Homs, and the lack international support suggest the council will struggle to provide services.
Military operations to capture Afrin and Jarablus did not cause massive destruction, but public infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, and water and electricity utilities, was badly damaged. The need to urgently repair infrastructure in Jarablus has shaped Turkey’s dependence on short-term rather than sustainable solutions. As a result, public services are either non-existent or of poor quality, particularly in the countryside. Turkey is expected to replicate that approach to rebuild Afrin’s civil institutions such as schools and restore water and electricity services to quickly rehabilitate its negative image. Additionally, mines and IEDs reportedly planted throughout the city will further hinder rebuilding efforts.
In Jarablus, humanitarian efforts have been limited to Turkey and its approved organizations. Syrian and international actors have to indirectly channel support through Turkish-approved organizations in a monopoly that has increased residents’ dependence on Turkey and prevented them from raising their own funds for much-needed projects. Turkey is expected to impose a similar stranglehold in Afrin to ensure that aid does not go to the YPG or its supporters.
Security in Afrin is also more complicated than in Jarablus, with the capture of the former followed by widespread looting, some of which was committed by rebel fighters. In response, Turkey established a military police force to secure areas, but some rebel factions present in the city continued to commit violations. The Jarablus case shows that Turkey’s efforts over nearly two years to restore security have largely been unsuccessful.
The sustainability of Turkey’s success in Afrin depends largely on governance and security in the city, which will require shoring up the legitimacy of the new council. Short-term reconstruction should be replaced with long-term strategies to ensure the provision of services. Finally, Turkey must be more responsive to local sensitivities that have contributed to tensions between Arabs and Kurds, and initiate reconciliation.
Haid Haid is a research fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalization at King’s College London. He is also a consulting research fellow of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa program.
AFP PHOTO / Sameer Al-Doumy
