Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein, rarely have the Kurds felt so threatened. Across three countries, Kurdish communities have seen territorial and political gains rolled back. In Syria, in particular, the Kurds have seen their alliance with the United States weakening and Turkey flexing its military muscles, with Russian help. Sensing that the tide may be turning against them, Syria’s Kurds are taking steps to hold on to their territory and power – even if that means doing a deal with Bashar Al Assad.
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Syria’s Kurds, based mainly in the country’s northeast near the Turkish border, tried to carefully balance the regime and the rebels, seeking to ensure their position was not threatened. But as the regime’s grip loosened outside of the major urban areas, the Kurds sought to distance themselves from the regime, in preparation for a form of devolved government or even separation.
The response from Turkey, which has problems with Kurdish militants inside Turkey and accuses the two groups of links, has been overwhelming.
Having retaken a strategic Syrian town, Afrin, from Kurdish militants in February, Turkey has now turned its attention to Manbij, a small city, in northern Syria, on the western bank of the Euphrates river that is of huge strategic importance. The city was under the control of ISIS before the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) retook it in 2016. The SDF is dominated by Syrian Kurdish militants, which Turkey claims are allied with Kurdish militants inside Turkey. It has made a central plank of its military policy inside Syria to deny these militants any presence along its border.
In June, Turkey and the US, which had been backing the SDF, agreed a “roadmap” that would lead to the withdrawal of Kurdish fighters from the city, to be replaced by Turkish and US military personnel. The Kurdish groups left the following day.
For the US, this joint-patrol plan is a way of satisfying both its Nato ally Turkey as well as its Kurdish allies, and staving off a Turkish military assault on the city. But despite rhetoric that the US is there for the long haul, Ankara is almost certainly banking on American fatigue, particularly with a president like Donald Trump in the White House. Eventually, Ankara reasons, the US will tire of having a presence in a little-known part of Syria and head home, handing the city to them without a shot being fired.
Last month, Turkey also conducted operations against Kurdish militants deep inside Iraqi territory, sending fighter jets into the Qandil mountains. The strikes were coordinated with Iran, raising fears among Kurds that Iran, which has influence over Iraq’s government in Baghdad, may seek to squeeze the Kurds when the new Iraqi government is finally formed. The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has threatened to stay in northern Iraq for a long time.
Inside Turkey, too, the Kurdish situation has been complicated by the most recent presidential and parliamentary election. On the one hand, the largest pro-Kurdish party, the People’s Democratic Party, or HDP, won more seats in parliament than before, gaining around 11 per cent of the vote – and this with its presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtas running from behind bars. On the other, Erdogan has entered into a coalition with the Nationalist Action Party, or MHP, which is fiercely opposed to dialogue with Kurdish groups, even democratic ones. If the MHP begins to agitate against Turkey’s Kurdish community, Erdogan, sensing a threat to him from the nationalist right, will likely follow.
Hemmed in on three sides, the Kurds are now seeking support from an unexpected source: Damascus.
Syria’s Kurds don’t intend to let Manbij go; if need be, they would rather the Syrian regime returned than see it controlled by Turkey. The same goes for much of the territory in the northeast of Syria that they control. If they cannot hold on to it alone, they would prefer to do so in conjunction with the regime. Kurdish politicians like to say that there are only two Syrian groups that control territory, them and the regime.
The two sides have been sending signals. At the start of June, Al Assad gave an interview in which he said that the door for negotiations with the Kurds was open (although he added, “if not, we’re going to resort to liberating those areas by force”). A senior Kurdish politician, Aldar Xelil, then responded, saying he was open to “a historic turning point” with the regime.
If Syria’s Kurds do turn toward the regime, it could upset the delicate balance across the region. The US, which has allied itself with the Kurdish-dominated SDF, could hardly be seen to prop up a militia that was itself propping up the Syrian regime. For Iraq’s Kurds, who still pump oil via Turkey, a regime-allied Kurdish community next door would require delicate diplomacy to navigate. The same applies to Kurds inside Turkey, who know Erdogan would make much of any links with their Syrian neighbors.
The complexity of the Kurdish issue means that any change of political allegiance in Syria would have effects elsewhere. But for the Kurds, squeezed by Turkey and abandoned by the US, it is still a powerful political card – and one they fully intend to play when the moment is right.
Faisal Al Yafai is currently writing a book on the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa.
AFP PHOTO/Delil Souleiman
